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FEMALE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS
AND PRISONER PRIVACY
MARY ANN FARKAS* AND KATHRYN R.L. RAND"
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, women have only been employed in female correctional
institutions in contact positions since the late nineteenth century. It was
then that separate reformatories were established for females. Because
jails and prisons were sex-segregated by correctional staff and inmates
and there was generally only one state facility for women, only a small
number of female officers could work in corrections at a given time.'
The major reasons women were not hired in male prisons were concerns
about their safety and security, their effect on the behavior of male
inmates, and the possibility of violations of inmate privacy. Male prison
administrators and male guards were either strongly opposed to the
presence of women in male prisons or concerned about the consequences
of their presence in the institutions.2
It was not until the 1970s that the integration of correctional staffs
occurred in all-male institutions. This change was largely due to a
growing realization among women of the greater job availability (more
prisons for men), higher pay in men's institutions, and the promotional
opportunities available with the wider range of experience in the
correctional system.' The major impetus, however, was Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.4 The original Act prohibited employment
discrimination on the basis of sex, but this proscription applied only to
private sector employment.5 In 1972, Congress passed amendments to
* Professor in the Criminology and Law Studies Program at Marquette University.
Professor Farkas' principal areas of teaching and research center on women as victims,
offenders, and workers in the criminal justice system and law and practice in corrections.
** Law Clerk to Chief Judge J.P. Stadtmueller, United States District Court, Eastern
District of Wisconsin. B.A., University of North Dakota, 1990; J.D., University of Michigan
Law School, 1993.
1. See CLARICE FEINMAN, WOMEN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 172 (3d ed.
1994).
2. Rita J. Simon & Judith D. Simon, Female Guards in Men's Prisons, in IT'S A CRIME:
WOMEN AND JUSTICE 226-41 (Roslyn Muraskin & Ted Alleman eds., 1993).
3. Joycelyn M. Pollock, Gender, Justice, and Social Control, in WOMEN, LAW, AND
SOCIAL CONTROL 28 (Alida V. Merlo & Joycelyn M. Pollock eds., 1995).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 §§ 2000e- 2000e15 (1964) (amended in 1972).
5. Id.
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the Act which extended the prohibition of employment discrimination
on the basis of sex to state, county, and local levels.6 In order to prove
that sex discrimination had taken place, the plaintiff must demonstrate
(1) that the employer had discriminated intentionally, or (2) that "facially
neutral" employment practices had a disparate impact on women.
7
Disparate impact of a facially neutral employment practice refers to a
practice that is not intended to be discriminatory, but which results in
disparate impact or discrimination in hiring, assignment, employment
conditions, promotion, or discharge.8 Armed with Title VII, women
were then able to bring suits against officials who had refused to hire
them as corrections officers in all-male prisons.
Nevertheless, prisoner privacy remains an issue with regard to the
employment of corrections officers. Employment discrimination suits
brought by women were countered by a flood of prisoner litigation
seeking to enforce constitutional privacy rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The courts' response to these suits has been less than uniform, despite
some clear directives from the United States Supreme Court. Several
issues regarding prisoner privacy remain undecided, and, thus, their
impact on the employment of women as corrections officers is unclear.
The tension between prisoner privacy and Title VII's prohibition on
sex discrimination in employment comes to a head in the context of
searches of inmates. When searches are conducted by guards of the
opposite sex, the privacy implications are heightened. This Article will
explore the extent and ramifications of privacy rights of prisoners against
searches, particularly by guards of the opposite sex, in the context of
employment of female corrections officers. Part II examines women's
employment rights under Title VII and concludes that women have the
right to work as corrections officers, and have the right to the same
promotional opportunities as male officers. Part III similarly examines
prisoners' constitutional rights in the context of searches, particularly
those performed by guards of the opposite sex, and concludes that
prisoners have at least a limited right to same-sex searches. Part IV
identifies and discusses those issues presently undecided by the courts
and their impact on the integration of correctional work. The Article
concludes that in order for prison management to assess potential
liability for cross-gender searches and to act accordingly, the courts must
6. Id.
7. See generally Griggs v. Duke, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. Inger J. Sagatun, Gender Discrimination in Criminal Justice: Relevant Law and Future
Trends, 2 WOMEN & CRIM. JusT. 63, 67 (1990).
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clearly and consistently delineate and apply existing law regarding
prisoner privacy.
II. TITLE VII AND CORRECTIONAL WORK
Women were generally successful in using Title VII to gain employ-
ment in male prisons until 1977, when a critical ruling by the United
States Supreme Court threatened to subvert the progress made by
women.9 Dothard v. Rawlinson0 became the first and only case of
unlawful sex discrimination in the hiring of female correctional officers
to reach the highest court. In that case, Dianne Rawlinson used Title
VII to challenge the validity of an Alabama statute specifying minimum
height and weight requirements of five feet, two inches, and 120 pounds
for employment as a prison guard, as well as an Alabama regulation
prohibiting the hiring of women as prison guards in contact positions that
require continual close proximity to inmates." Rawlinson had been
rejected as a prison guard after failing to meet the minimum weight
requirement. 2 The Supreme Court concluded that Title VII prohibited
application of Alabama's facially neutral height and weight statute
because (a) the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of unlawful
sex discrimination upon showing that the statutory requirements would
exclude over forty-one percent of the nation's female population while
excluding less than one percent of the male population, 3 and (b) the
prima facie case had not been rebutted on the ground that the statutory
requirements were job-related as having a relationship to the strength
essential to effective job performance as a prison guard, because no
evidence was presented by the defendants to correlate the statutory
requirements with the amount of strength thought to be essential. 4
However, the Court held that the Alabama regulation barring the
hiring of women guards in "contact positions"-that is positions requiring
continual close proximity to inmates-at all male prisons fell within the
ambit of section 703(e) of Title VII, which permits sex-based discrimina-
tion where sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ). 5
The Court reasoned that the use of women as guards in "contact
9. Lynn A. Zimmer, The Legal Problems of Implementing Title VII in the Prisons, 7
ALSA Forum 202 (1983).
10. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
11. Id. at 323-24.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 329-30.
14. Id. at 331-32.
15. Id. at 334.
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positions" in the particular conditions of the Alabama prison would pose
a substantial security problem directly linked to the sex of the prison
guard. 6 Furthermore, the Court recognized the likelihood that inmates
would assault a woman simply because she was a woman. The court
believed that this constituted a threat not only to the assault victim, but
also to the basic control of the prison and the protection of its inmates
and other security personnel. 7 Although Dothard is the only case of
this nature to reach the Supreme Court, it did not establish a precedent
for excluding women from work assignments involving direct inmate
contact in male correctional institutions. Subsequent case law has
distinguished Dothard on the basis of differences between prison
conditions and the inmate populations in maximum security Alabama
prisons.
In Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory,8 the single issue was
whether Iowa's rules preventing women from obtaining jobs above the
Correction Officer I ("CO I") level at the Reformatory fell within the
extremely narrow BFOQ exception to Title VII's general prohibition
against sex discrimination. 9 The defendants contended that contact
positions for female officers would violate inmate privacy rights,
jeopardize prison security and rehabilitative programs, place both male
and female guards in increased danger, and lead to major disciplinary
problems.2" In addition, the defendants claimed that allowing women
to achieve a CO II status and fashioning a rotation to avoid placing them
in dangerous areas or areas where inmate privacy must be maintained
would be unfair to male officers and would create serious administrative
problems.2' The district court constructed three questions to decide
whether a legitimate BFOQ existed:
(1) Would the essence of the institution and its goals be under-
mined by not hiring men only?
(2) Is there reasonable cause to believe (that is a factual basis for
believing), that all or substantially all women would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job?
16. Id. at 333-37. Conditions in the Alabama prison had been characterized by "rampant
violence" with no attempt to classify or segregate inmates in the male, dormitory-style prisons
according to their offenses or dangerousness. Id. at 334-35
17. Id. at 336.
18. 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 966 (1980).
19. Gunther, 462 F. Supp. at 954.
20. Id. at 955.
21. Id.
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(3) Would any personnel adjustments... impinge on the efficient
and effective operation of the facility?22
The court ruled that the defendants failed to bear their burden of proof
that a BFOQ was reasonably necessary to the normal functioning of the
Reformatory or that denial of a BFOQ would create the possibility of a
breakdown of legitimate governmental interests.' Similarly, the
defendants failed to show that there were no reasonably available
alternative practices with less discriminatory impact that would satisfy the
legitimate needs of the institution.24 Thus, the court ordered that the
plaintiff be promoted to Correctional Officer II.'
In the following year, another case questioned the legitimacy of a
BFOQ prohibiting women from employment in the male quarters of a
correctional institution. In Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation
Center,6 Lena M. Harden brought an action against the Rehabilitation
Center alleging sex discrimination.27 Harden had been employed as a
Rehabilitation Specialist I in the female quarters of the facility.28 She
was not allowed to transfer to the male section when the female quarters
closed.29 The defendants asserted that the BFOQ was instituted to
protect male inmates' privacy." The district court concluded that the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination by proving
that the defendants had promulgated an occupational qualification
prohibiting females from serving as specialists in the male quarters of the
Rehabilitation Center.3' The district court further ruled that the state
failed to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for establishing
the bona fide occupational qualifications.32 Finally, the Court found
that the defendants failed to demonstrate:
(1) that they had a factual basis for believing that substantially all
women would be unable to safely and efficiently perform the
duties involved; (2) that they could not rearrange job responsibili-
ties in a way to minimize the clash between privacy interests and
[p]laintiff's equal employment opportunities; or (3) that the
22. Id. at 956.
23. Id. at 958.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981), affd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985).
27. Harden, 520 F. Supp. at 771.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Harden, 520 F. Supp. at 771.
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[BFOQ] was based on administrative necessity rather than
convenience.33
In Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections,' female correc-
tional officers brought a class action against the Michigan Department
of Corrections and the Michigan Civil Service Commission on behalf of
"all women employees and correctional officers now working or who
have worked at the all-male maximum security institutions in Michigan
and who are denied or who have been denied promotional opportunities
because of the defendants' policies of not allowing women to work
within the housing of residential units."35  While the defendants
acknowledged that female employees were not allowed to serve in
certain sensitive custodial positions, they insisted that
the disadvantages (e.g. danger to safety of the female officer,
impairment to the security of the correctional institution, and
violation of the inmates' right to privacy), which are inherent in
having women in close contact situations with inmates, greatly
outweigh all of the advantages which would result from any other
alternative solution.36
The court held that (1) inmates did not possess any protected right
under the Constitution against being viewed while naked by correctional
officers of opposite sex, and thus, gender was not a "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" for correctional officers who would be in the
position to view inmates while naked;37 (2) probabilities of sexual
assaults on female correctional officers and potential impact on prison
discipline and rehabilitation opportunities were not of a magnitude that
justified making gender a bona fide occupational qualification;38 and (3)
employment and promotional policies and practices violated the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of gender.39
33. Id. at 775.
34. 654 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
35. Id. at 692.
36. Id. at 699.
37. Id. at 702-03.
38. Id. at 704.
39. Id. at 703-05. The court stated:
In order to sustain their BFOQ defense, [d]efendants must initially show that the
legitimate functions of the Michigan prisons, which were involved in this litigation,
would have been undermined by the promotion of women to positions at the grade
07 level and above. Second, [d]efendants must prove that there is reasonable cause
to believe that all, or substantially all, of [p]laintiffs would have been unable to
perform the job safely and efficiently. Finally, [d]efendants, as employers, must show
that the failure to promote women was based on actual sexual characteristics rather
than upon stereotyped assumptions.
[Vol. 80:9951000
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In two more recent cases, the courts have ruled in favor of the prison
administration concerning the job assignments of women corrections
officers. In particular, the courts have concurred with the prison
administrators in their assertion of legitimate concerns for institutional
safety and security in their job assignment policies. In Tharp v. Iowa
Department of Corrections,4 two male residential advisors (RAs)
alleged that gender-based shift assignments, in which female RAs were
assigned to the women's unit of a mixed-gender minimum security
prison, violated Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act." The Fort Des
Moines Residential Facility adopted a policy that only female RAs would
be assigned to the women's unit in response to certain times when no
female RAs were available to conduct same-sex searches or urinalysis of
female residents. 42 The district court ruled that the shift assignment
policy was adopted to meet "legitimate penological concerns" and that
the plaintiffs had "many different shift assignments and promotions
available to them."43 Hence the policy was a minimal restriction that
"did not deprive them of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect their employment status."'  The court applied a
"balancing analysis" in which a "prison employer's reasonable gender-
based job assignment policy, particularly a policy that is favorable to the
protected class of women employees, will be upheld if it imposes only a
'minimal restriction' on other employees."'45
In the second case, Carl v. Angelone, 6 male and female correctional
officers brought an action against the Director of the Nevada Depart-
ment of Prisons alleging that transferring male officers out oft and female
officers to, women's correctional facilities was intentionally discriminato-
ry-' The defendant conceded his actions were gender-based; he made
the transfers because "he wanted female correctional officers at the
women's correctional facilities and therefore transferred the male officers
out because they were men and transferred the female officers in
because they were women. '  In considering the issue of qualified
Id. at 701.
40. 68 F.3d 223 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1420 (1996).
41. Tharp, 68 F.3d at 224.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 225
44. Id. at 226.
45. Id.
46. 883 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Nev. 1995).
47. Id. at 1436.
48. Id.
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immunity to a public officer's use of the BFOQ doctrine to justify
discriminatory action, the district court held that the defendant could not
base his claim of qualified immunity on the BFOQ defense and that
issues of fact precluded summary judgment based on the defense.49
In summary, the courts have recognized the employment rights of
women correctional officers to work in prisons, including all-male
institutions. However, there is confusion with regard to equality in job
assignments, particularly positions which involve direct inmate contact.
The ambiguous and contradictory court rulings have provided no clear,
definitive direction for resolution of the conflict between the equal
employment rights of women correctional officers and the privacy rights
of male inmates.
III. INMATES' "RIGHT To PRIVACY"
A. Background of Prisoner Litigation Under Section 1983
Congress originally enacted Section 1983, which has been called "the
workhorse of civil rights litigation,"5 as section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871."' Popularly known as the Ku Klux Act, Congress intended
these reconstruction-era civil rights statutes to protect newly emancipated
blacks from violence in the South.52 Congress intended section 1983 to
serve three purposes: first, to override "invidious legislation by the
States against the rights or privileges of citizens of the United States;"53
second, to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate;' and
third, "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice."55 This third purpose
had the Klan specifically in mind;56 however, it is important to note that
"the remedy created was not a remedy against [the Klan] or its members
but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable
or unwilling to enforce a state law.,5 7 Congress mistrusted the state
49. Id. at 1437-42.
50. Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
51. Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871, Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
52. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This case describes the legislative history of
§ 1983 as "replete with references to the lawless conditions existing in the South in 1871." Id.
at 174.
53. Id. at 173 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 268 (1871)).
54. Id. at 173-74 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 345).
55. Id. at 174 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 365-66).
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 175-76.
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PRISONER PRIVACY
courts in particular: "[O]ne strong motive behind its enactment was grave
congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient in
protecting federal rights.""8 Thus, Congress created a potentially strong
and far-reaching federal remedy for citizens whose constitutional rights
were infringed upon by state actors.
Despite section 1983's potentially broad reach, many plaintiffs did not
utilize it to a great extent. Between 1871 and 1920, the courts decided
only twenty-one cases under section 1983.' 9  The 1871 Congress'
intentions notwithstanding, the federal civil rights program was not
without its low points during this period. Southern Democrats were
hostile toward radical reconstructionist control of their state governments
and used the state political processes to undo black and Republican gains
in the area of civil rights.' The effectiveness of the civil rights laws was
also undermined by racial prejudice in both the North and the South.
State and federal elections were marked by racial violence, and
supporters of racial equality were socially ostracized and physically
threatened.6' Enforcement of the civil rights laws was not a popular
cause.
The 1920s and 1930s saw modest gains in the development of civil
rights, but it was not until the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Monroe v. Pape62 that section 1983 reclaimed its intended role as the
premier means of enforcing federal civil rights. In Monroe, the Court
held that by alleging misconduct by police while searching their home,63
the plaintiffs had established a cause of action under section 19 8 3.'
58. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980) (citations omitted).
59. See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil
Remedy? 26 IND. LJ. 361, 363 (1951).
60. THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 60 (3d ed. 1991).
61. Id. at 61.
62. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monnell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
63. The Court stated that "on October 28, 1958, at 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chicago police
officers broke into the Monroes' home without an arrest or a search warrant." Monroe, 365
U.S. at 169. The officers routed the Monroes and their six children out of bed at gunpoint and
made them stand naked in the living room while the officers "ransacked every room, emptying
drawers and ripping mattress covers." Id. One of the officers, Detective Pape, struck Mr.
Monroe several times with his flashlight and called him "nigger" and "black boy." Id. at 203.
Other officers pushed, hit, and kicked Mrs. Monroe and the children. Id. Mr. Monroe then
was taken to the police station, where the police interrogated him regarding a two-day-old
murder. Id. Mr. Monroe was not taken before a magistrate, though one was available, and
he was not allowed to call his family or an attorney. Id. After being held for ten hours on
"open charges," Mr. Monroe was released without being charged with any crime. Id.
64. Id. at 187.
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Following the generous interpretation given to section 1983 in
Monroe, the Supreme Court issued several decisions that increased
section 1983's attractiveness as a remedy to civil rights plaintiffs. The
Court expanded the reach of section 1983 in Monell v. Department of
Social Services65 by holding that municipalities were "persons" within
the meaning of section 1983.66 The Court further ruled in Owen v. City
of Independence67 that the good faith of a municipal employee is not a
defense to municipal liability under section 1983.' In Maine v.
Thiboutot,69 the Court held that section 1983 is not limited to federal
constitutional rights, but may also be used to vindicate federal statutory
rights.70 Congress got into the act by passing the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, which authorized awards of attorney fees
to prevailing parties in actions brought under section 1983.7" As a
result of these developments, litigation under section 1983 has increased
dramatically.72
The Supreme Court created the basis for prisoner civil rights
litigation a few years before Monroe with its decision in Cooper v.
Pate.73 Cooper, an inmate at the Illinois State Penitentiary, filed a
"petition for Relief Under Civil Rights Act" in federal district court
alleging that he was not allowed to purchase religious publications and
materials connected to the Black Muslim Movement.74 The district
court dismissed Cooper's complaint and the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
stating:
Inmates of State penitentiaries should realize that prison officials
are vested with wide discretion in safe-guarding prisoners
committed to their custody. Discipline reasonably maintained in
State prisons is not under the supervisory direction of federal
courts. We think it is well settled that it is not the function of the
65. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
66. Id. at 701.
67. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
68. Id. at 638.
69. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
70. Id. at 9-10.
71. Id. at 8-9.
72. In 1960, 287 suits were filed in (or removed to) federal district court under the
federal civil rights statutes. 1950 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 232. In 1977, the
number of such suits jumped to 13,113, and in 1985, 17,582. 1977 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S.
CTs. ANN. REP. 189; 1985 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., Fed Jud. Workload Stats., A-12.
This "flood" of civil rights litigation has generated great concern for the perceived over-
burdening of the federal docket.
73. 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
74. Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
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courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in
penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who
are illegally confined. A prisoner may not approve of prison
rules and regulations, but under all ordinary circumstances that
is no basis for coming into a federal court seeking relief even
though he may claim that the restrictions placed upon his
activities are in violation of his constitutional rights.7'
The Supreme Court reversed in a one-paragraph opinion:
The petitioner, an inmate at the Illinois State Penitentiary,
brought an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . -
.. alleging that solely because of his religious beliefs he was
denied permission to purchase certain religious publications and
denied other privileges enjoyed by other prisoners. The District
Court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim on which relief could be granted and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. We reverse the judgment below. Taking as
true the allegations of the complaint, as they must be on a motion
to dismiss, the complaint stated a cause of action and it was error
to dismiss it.76
The Court's cursory recognition that section 1983 afforded prisoners
a civil remedy for constitutional violations belied the ramifications of its
decision. Cooper (and later Monroe) effectively opened the floodgates
on prisoner litigation.'
Later Supreme Court cases first expanded prisoner civil rights, then
retracted them in the face of the deluge of cases. To synopsize a few
that effectively encouraged prisoner civil rights litigation: in Johnson v.
Avery," the Court invalidated a ban on jailhouse lawyering; in Haines
v. Kerner,79 the Court held that prisoner complaints should not be
subject to summary dismissal to a greater extent than complaints filed by
nonprisoner litigants; and in Bounds v. Smith,"0 the Court upheld
75. Cooper, 324 F.2d at 167 (quoting Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944) and
Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1951)) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
76. Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546 (citations omitted).
77. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 60, at 152; Robert G. Doumar, Prisoners' Civil
Rights Suits: A Pompous Delusion, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1988). Civil rights cases
filed by prisoners accounted for 7,500 cases in the federal docket in 1977 and 19,000 cases in
1985. EISENBERG, supra note 60, at 152. In 1987, the figure reached 22,972. Jim Thomas,
Inmate Litigation: Using the Courts or Abusing Them?, 50 CORRECiiONS TODAY 124, 125-26
(1988).
78. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
79. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
80. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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prisoners' right to adequate law libraries or other legal assistance." On
the other side, the Supreme Court has limited section 1983 in the prison
context by holding that section 1983 may not be used as a substitute for
a writ of habeas corpus, Preiser v. Rodriguez;' that some forms of
equitable remedies as well as retroactive payment of damages are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment, Edelman v. Jordan;83 that negligence
cannot function as a basis for constitutional claims, Estelle v. Gamble;'
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against only deprivations of
liberty accomplished without due process, Baker v. McCollan; 5 and that
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to section 1983
actions, effectively requiring plaintiffs to choose a federal or state forum,
Allen v. McCurry.6
The Court appears sensitive to the plight of the district courts in
managing prisoner complaints. Justice Powell warned that "[tihe current
flood of petitions. . already threatens-because of sheer volume-to
submerge meritorious claims and even to produce a judicial insensitivity
to" claims brought by prisoners.87 Justice Blackmun has stated that
recent Court opinions "reflect a growing uneasiness with the heretofore
pronounced breadth of [section 1983] and, in my view, a tendency to
strain otherwise sound doctrines .... 88
B. Prisoner Privacy and the Constitution
Prisoner civil rights claims run the gamut from allegations of
restrictions on prisoners' hairstyles to allegations of denial of hormone
treatments for transsexual prisoners. Section 1983 provides a remedy for
violations of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and [federal] laws" that occur under color of state law.89 Thus, the
statute applies only to alleged deprivations of federal constitutional or
statutory rights. Prisoners typically raise civil rights claims under various
Amendments to the Constitution (most commonly the First, Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments). While prisoners forfeit many
81. Id. at 828.
82. 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
83. 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
84. 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
85. 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).
86. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
87. Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 8 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
88. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
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rights,9" "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution."'" "The fact of confinement,"
however, "as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal
institution limits these retained constitutional rights."'92 The orderly
operation of prisons generally has been committed to prison officials, not
the federal courts, which "are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly
urgent problems of prison administration and reform."'93 Such matters
are within the peculiar expertise of corrections officials and, therefore,
the courts generally will accord great deference to their expert judgment,
unless there is substantial evidence to argue against it.94  "Prison
administration is... a task that has been committed to the responsibility
of [the legislative and executive branches] and separation of powers
concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal
system is involved, federal courts have.., additional reason to accord
deference to the appropriate prison authorities."'95 Government actions
that infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights are valid, generally
speaking, if they have a rational relationship to legitimate penological
interests.
96
Obviously, incarceration requires some limitations on constitutional
rights and privileges. These limitations are justified by the needs of
prison security, as well as the penal objectives of deterrence and
rehabilitation. Prison life necessarily involves invasions of privacy:
90. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,545-46 (1979) ("[S]imply because prison inmates retain
certain constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and
limitations .... A detainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an
unincarcerated individual.").
91. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984).
92. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 (citing Jones v. North Carolina's Prisoner's Labor Union, 433
U.S. 119, 125 (1977) and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
93. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,405 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401 (1989).
94. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547-48.
95. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 89. In making that determination, courts will consider four factors: First,
whether there is "a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it"; second, "whether there are
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates"; third, "the
impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally"; and fourth, whether there are
"obvious, easy alternatives" to the prison regulation. Id. at 89-90. Where there is no suspect
class involved, an inmate who challenges a particular prison practice or regulation must show
that the regulation is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental concern, but is an
"exaggerated response" to that concern. Id. at 90.
1997] 1007
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
A prisoner is mortified and vulgarized not only by having to
continually expose himself as he is moved and stored in the
company of others; he is also defiled by being subject to their
exposure .... The custody orientation negates privacy in
innumerable other ways. These include such purposive intrusions
as periodic headcounts, nightly checks, inspections or shakedowns
of prisoners' living areas and belongings. Whatever tends to
disturb visibility is forbidden.97
Courts, recognizing this reality, have not construed inmates' privacy
rights broadly. Nevertheless, prisoners have challenged prison practices,
ostensibly on privacy grounds, under both the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments.98
In Bell v. Wolfish,99 a class of pretrial detainees challenged the
constitutionality of shakedown room searches and visual body cavity
searches performed at a federal detention facility in New York City.t"°
The lower courts had applied a "compelling necessity" standard,' that
is, that pretrial detainees could be subjected only to restrictions which
are "justified by the compelling necessities of jail administration,""°2
and determined that the detainees had a right to observe searches of
their rooms, as well as a right against body cavity searches, without
probable cause to believe that the inmate was concealing contraband. 3
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist rejected the compelling-necessity standard, finding no
constitutional basis for the standard."° Instead, the Court directed that
alleged violations of specific constitutional guarantees in the prison
setting "must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison
administration, safeguarding institutional security."' 5 With regard to
the shakedown searches, the Court cautioned, "it may well be argued
that a person confined in a detention facility has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell and that therefore
97. Barry Schwartz, Deprivation of Privacy as a "Functional Prerequisite": The Case of
the Prison, 63 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 229, 232, 234 (1972).
98. The Fourth Amendment guards "against unreasonable searches and seizures," while
the Eighth Amendment protects against infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S.
CONST. amends. IV, VIII.
99. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
100. Id. at 523.
101. Id. at 524.
102. Id. at 523-24.
103. Id. at 527-30.
104. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 532.
105. Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
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the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a person."'106
Nevertheless, the Court assumed that the detainees retained a diminished
expectation of privacy. Applying this standard, the Court determined
that unobserved shakedown room searches were not unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. 0 7
The Court reached the same conclusion with regard to the visual
body cavity searches. The detainees, like other federal prisoners, were
"required to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of
a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from
outside the institution."'0" The Court, again applying a Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness analysis, stated:
Admittedly, this practice instinctively gives us the most pause.
However, assuming for present purposes that inmates ... retain
some Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment to a correc-
tions facility, we nonetheless conclude that these searches do not
violate that Amendment. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only
unreasonable searches and under the circumstances, we do not
believe that these searches are unreasonable.
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is
not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In
each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search
entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intru-
sion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. A detention
facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers.
Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all
too common an occurrence.10
The Court was not persuaded that the searches were made unreasonable
because there had been only one instance of an attempt to smuggle
contraband into the facility."0
Thus, the Court concluded that the detainees (and, it follows,
prisoners)... were subject to reasonable room and body searches, with
reasonableness being a balance between the prisoner's interest in his
106. Id. at 556-57.
107. Id. at 562-63.
108. Id. at 558.
109. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 559.
111. See id. at 545 "A fortiori, pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any
crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted
prisoners." Id. at 545.
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privacy and/or bodily integrity and the institution's security interest."2
The proper balance, under the Court's analysis, did not require probable
cause."3 It did, however, preclude conducting searches "in an abusive
fashion. '4 Despite this extremely narrow interpretation of pretrial
detainee Fourth Amendment rights, lower courts continued to find
Fourth Amendment violations in the prison setting after Wolfish.
In Hudson v. Palmer,"5 however, the Supreme Court denounced
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in the prison context.
Palmer, an inmate at a state penitentiary in Virginia, filed a civil rights
complaint alleging that his property had been destroyed during a
shakedown search of his cell.116 The appellate court, following Wolfish,
held that prisoners had a limited privacy right against searches conducted
solely to harass or humiliate.'
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply within a
prison cell:
[S]ociety is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective
expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell
and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the
prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their
individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of
incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institu-
tions. '8
Calling prisons "volatile 'communit[ies],"' the Court explained that
prison officials "must be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and
other contraband into the premises ... ; they must prevent, so far as
possible, the flow of illicit weapons into the prison; they must be vigilant
to detect escape plots, in which drugs or weapons may be involved,
before the schemes materialize1.' 9 Thus, the Court concluded, "the
prisoner's expectation of privacy [must] always yield to what must be
considered the paramount interest in institutional security. '
The Court suggested that although the Fourth Amendment would not
112. Id. at 559-60.
113. Id. at 560.
114. Id.
115. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
116. Id. at 520.
117. Id. at 521.
118. Id. at 526.
119. Id. at 526-27.
120. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 528.
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offer any protection in a prison cell, inmates might find redress under the
Eighth Amendment:
Our holding that [Palmer] does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections of
the Fourth Amendment does not mean that he is without a
remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. Nor
does it mean that prison attendants can ride roughshod over
inmates' property rights with impunity. The Eighth Amendment
always stands as a protection against "cruel and unusual punish-
ments."''
Hudson v. Palmer has been criticized as a stunningly narrow view of
the Fourth Amendment. It closed off any possibility of Fourth
Amendment protection for prisoners' cells, leaving only the Eighth
Amendment to protect against harassing or injurious searches. It left
open, however, whether the Fourth Amendment would apply to more
intrusive searches, such as body cavity searches.
The Eighth Amendment proscribes "cruel and unusual punish-
ments."'" In the context of searches, two aspects of Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence are applicable: excessive force and conditions of
confinement.
The "core judicial inquiry"'" in deciding an excessive physical force
claim is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.' 2 4
Factors in deciding "whether the use of force could plausibly have been
thought necessary... or instead evinced such wantonness with respect
to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing
willingness that it occur" include the extent of the inmate's injury, the
need for force as compared to the amount of force used, the threat
perceived by the official, and "any efforts made to temper the severity
of a forceful response.""l  De minimis uses of physical force, however,
121. Id. at 530.
122. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
123. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
124. Id. (recognizing standards set forth in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1986)).
125. Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). The Supreme Court explained:
While Estelle [v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976),] establishes that deliberate indifference
entails something more than mere negligence, the cases are also clear that it is
satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing
harm or with knowledge that harm will result. That point underlies the ruling that
"application of the deliberate indifference standard is inappropriate" in one class of
prison cases: when "officials stand accused of using excessive physical force."
1997]
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are excluded from constitutional recognition, "provided that the use of
force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind."'
1 26
"Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional
rights."'
127
Valid Eighth Amendment claims based on a prisoner's conditions of
confinement must contain an objective component which alleges a
sufficiently serious deprivation, and a subjective component which shows
or indicates that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to this serious
deprivation. 2 The Supreme Court recently articulated the deliberate
indifference standard applicable to a conditions-of-confinement claim in
Farmer v. Brennan:
129
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference. This approach comports best with the text of the
Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth
Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual "conditions"; it
[Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 6-7; see also Whitley, supra, 475 U.S. at 320.] In
such situations, where the decisions of prison officials are typically made "'in haste,
under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance,"' [Hudson, 503
U.S., at 6, 112 S. Ct., at 998 (quoting Whitley, supra, 475 U.S. at 320)], an Eighth
Amendment claimant must show more than "indifference," deliberate of otherwise.
The claimant must show that officials applied force "maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm," [503 U.S. at 6] or, as the Court also put it, that
officials used force with "a knowing willingness that [harm] occur." [503 U.S. at 7].
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994) (some citations omitted).
126. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
127. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, Employee-Officer
John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). The lower courts have applied Hudson's de minimis
standard to hold that some uses of force do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
See Jackson v. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699,700 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that spraying of prisoner
with fire extinguisher, which caused no injury, was de minimis); Olson v. Coleman, 804 F.
Supp. 148, 150 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding that a single blow to prisoner's head by guard, which
caused a contusion, was de minimis and not repugnant); Gabai v. Jacoby, 800 F. Supp. 1149,
1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that prisoner's allegation that guard pushed him into a chair,
causing a bruise on his arm, was insufficient to state a claim of excessive force); Candelaria
v. Coughlin, 787 F. Supp. 368, 374 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd, 979 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding
that prisoner's allegation that guard "pushed his fist into my neck so that I couldn't move and
I was losing my breath" was de minimis).
128. See Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1994).
129. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
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outlaws cruel and unusual "punishments." An act or omission
unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might
well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does
result society might well wish to assure compensation. The
common law reflects such concerns when it imposes tort liability
on a purely objective basis. But an official's failure to alleviate
a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while
no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be con-
demned as the infliction of punishment. 13
Thus, the Supreme Court has left open whether a Fourth
Amendment reasonableness analysis, albeit limited by the fact of
incarceration, should apply to bodily searches of prisoners.
Searches of prison cells, however, clearly are subject only to the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments. The next section illustrates the monkey wrench of
cross-gender searches in the Court's prison-search jurisprudence.
C. Prisoner Privacy Under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments in the
Context of Cross-Gender Searches
The right to privacy, though not explicit, is among the individual
liberties protected by the Constitution. 3' The Supreme Court has
deemed it "settled now.., that the Constitution places limits on a
State's right to interfere with a person's [bodily integrity].' ' 32 As
discussed above, it appears that prisoners may retain some Fourth
Amendment protection against bodily searches. As the Supreme Court
has admitted, body cavity searches "instinctively give us the most
pause."'133
Nakedness, it seems, particularly triggers one's right to privacy: "One
of the clearest forms of degradation in Western Society is to strip a
person of his clothes. The right to be free from strip searches and
degrading body inspections is thus basic to the concept of privacy." '134
Nakedness witnessed by a member of the opposite sex is even worse, or
at least courts have recognized it as such. 3 5  Inmates have challenged,
130. Id. at 837-38 (citations omitted).
131. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992).
132. Id. at 849 (citations omitted).
133. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).
134. 3 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACrICE % 25.02[1] (George B. Trubow ed., 1991).
135. See, e.g., York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (stating that "[t]he desire
to shield one's unclothed figured [sic] from views of strangers, and particularly strangers of the
opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity"). The Seventh
Circuit recently added a politically correct qualifier:
We note that York, many of the cases discussed below involving cross-gender
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and courts have analyzed, such searches under both the Fourth and the
Eighth Amendments.
Of course, only unreasonable searches are prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, to determine the reasonableness of a given search,
the court must balance the privacy interests of the prisoner against the
legitimate penological interests of the institution.'36 In this context, the
interest of the prison generally is identified as providing equal employ-
ment opportunities to female correction officers. The Eighth Amend-
ment, on the other hand, protects against cruel and unusual punishments.
This appears to be a more onerous burden for the prisoner, particularly
if the prisoner is a male, when challenging cross-gender searches.
In Grummett v. Rushen,137 prison inmates brought a class action
alleging that the prison's policy of allowing female guards to view male
inmates in states of partial or total nudity while dressing, showering,
being strip searched, or using toilet facilities violated the inmates' privacy
rights.'38 The court determined that although the prison's policy
regarding female guards' duties created a "great" potential "for female
guards to view male inmates disrobing, showering, and using toilet
facilities, the actual viewing is not frequent."'' 39 The court agreed that
the inmates had an "interest in not being viewed naked by members of
the opposite sex," which "is protected by the right of privacy,"' 4 ° but
believed that the infrequency of actual viewing by female guards of nude
male inmates precluded relief. "[T]he inmates have not demonstrated
that these restricted observations by members of the opposite sex are so
degrading as to require intervention by this court."''
observations and strip searches, as well as [the plaintiff's] brief on appeal here, make
a common assumption. In their declaration that "the nudity taboo, and hence the
invasion of privacy involved when it is forcibly broken, is much greater between the
sexes than among members of the same sex," these authorities and submissions
appear to assume that all of the relevant actors are heterosexual.
Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
136. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 72, 89 (1987); Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
137. 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
138. Id. at 492-93.
139. Id. at 492.
140. Id. at 494.
141. Id. at 495. The court characterized the female guards' observation of male inmates
as limited:
Female guards are not assigned to positions requiring unrestricted and frequent
surveillance. Rather, the positions to which they are assigned require infrequent and
casual observation, or observation at a distance. Female guards working the tiers
walk past the cells routinely, but do not stop for prolonged inspection. When they
are not walking down the tiers, their view of the inmates in their cells is circum-
1014 [Vol. 80:995
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In Smith v. Fairman,42 a prisoner challenged the prison's policy of
allowing female guards to conduct pat-down searches of male in-
mates. 43  The court first analyzed Smith's claim under the Eighth
Amendment and found it lacking. Despite the "humiliating and
degrading experience" of a pat-down search conducted by a member of
the opposite sex,'" Smith's claim "clearly falls short of the kind of
shocking, barbarious [sic] treatment proscribed by the Eighth Amend-
ment."' 4  The court accepted the argument that although a prisoner
"clearly has no ground on which he could challenge the mere fact that
he was frisked,"'" the fact that a female conducted the frisk changed
the constitutional posture of Smith's claim. 47 Nevertheless, the court
found the prison's policy of instructing female guards to exclude a
prisoner's genital area when conducting a pat-down was a sufficient
accommodation of Smith's privacy right."
scribed by the cell bars and by the distance and angle of their stations. Likewise, the
observations by the female correctional officers stationed on the gunrails overlooking
the tiers and the yard areas are obscured by the angle and distance of their locations.
Female guards do not accompany male inmates to the individual or gang showers,
and are not stationed on the tiers where the showers are located. Females are
assigned to the more distant gunrail position overlooking showers, where, again, the
surveillance is obscured.
Id. at 494-95 (footnote omitted).
142. 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983).
143. Id. at 53.
144. Id. The court stated:
For our present purposes we will assume that having to endure what is commonly
referred to as a frisk or pat-down search could to some persons be a humiliating and
degrading experience. Even so limited a search as this "is a serious intrusion upon
the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and it is not to be taken lightly." To require one not only to submit to
such a search, but to have it performed by a member of the opposite sex could well,
for many people, only add to the feeling of degradation. Rational prison manage-
ment should recognize this basic fact of human behavior and, where possible, respond
accordingly.
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 17 (1968)) (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. Fairman, 678 F.2d at 54.
147. Id. at 54-55.
148. Id. at 55. The court continued:
While plaintiff evidently finds even this limited touching by a person of the
opposite sex to be offensive, we do not read the Constitution so broadly. As Judge
Frankel aptly noted in United States ex reL Wolfish v. Levi:
[this]subject lies ... in a sector of the community's mores where the state of flux
is uniquely notable ....
In the last analysis ... the overriding facts may well be the phenomena of
uncertainty and change. And these counsel a tentative and gingerly approach
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In Hudson v. Goodlander,'49 once again a male inmate complained
that his privacy right was violated when female correctional officers
viewed him using the toilet, undressing, and showering.' The prison
had issued a policy that "all female Correctional Officers will be assigned
to all officer posts,"'51 but also had directed that the policy "should not
be interpreted to mean that female Correctional Officers must be
assigned to inmate housing areas on a regular basis."' 52  The court
found that even the "infrequent assignment" of female guards to posts
at which they might observe nude or partially nude male inmates created
"literally hundreds of opportunities for incidents such as those com-
plained of by plaintiff."'53  As a result, the court concluded, the
plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy was violated."M The court
granted the plaintiff injunctive relief, ordering the prison to exclude
female guards from some areas.155
At least one district court has bucked this trend, only to be reversed
by the court of appeals. In Canedy v. Boardman,'56 Canedy, a male
inmate, raised a typical Fourth Amendment right to privacy challenge to
female guards' daily observation of male inmates, dressing, sleeping,
showering, and using toilet facilities, as well as a female guard's
participation in a strip search of Canedy'57 The district court dis-
by the judges. The community's standards are obviously prime concerns in
deciding how to regulate contacts, relationships, and exercises of authority
between people of opposite sexes. Judges are not by office or training specially
qualified as the regulators.
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
149. 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1980).
150. Id. at 891.
151. Id. at 892.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 893-95.
155. Id. at 894-95.
156. 801 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Wis. 1992), rev'd, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994). For other
district courts holding that inmates do not possess a privacy right protecting against being
viewed while nude by guards of the opposite sex, see Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections,
654 F. Supp. 690, 701-03 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("Inmates do not possess any protected right under
the Constitution against being viewed while naked by correctional officers of the opposite
sex."); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (D. Or. 1983) ("Male prisoners in the
Oregon correctional institutions have no federal constitutional rights to freedom from clothed
'pat-down' frisk searches and/or visual observations in states of undress performed by female
correctional officer guards.").
157. Canedy, 801 F. Supp. at 254-55. The district court summarized Canedy's factual
allegations:
At 9:06 a.m., on or about February 21, 1992, corrections officers came to unit #2
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missed the complaint for failure to state a claim, employing the balancing
prescribed by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish:158
I find it problematic to impose the condition of inadvertency
or infrequency or randomness upon observations by guards of the
opposite sex. As much as I can empathize with the dehumaniza-
tion suffered by individuals who are confined to penal institutions
and forced to surrender nearly every aspect of the privacy
treasured in our society, I cannot accept the premise that the
difference between being viewed by a prison official of one sex
rather than the other is significant enough to warrant limitations
on the employment opportunities of correctional officers of the
opposite sex. When that differential in privacy is weighed against
the rights of present and prospective prison officials to fair and
equal employment oportunities, it is too light to tip the scales in
favor of the inmate. ' 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,
stating:
[Canedy's] complaint can fairly be read to allege that he has
for a complete shakedown. There were ten or twelve officers present in front of cells
one through six. Two female officers were in front of cells four and five.
Defendant Radtke ordered the strip search of the prisoners in unit #2. Plaintiff
was stripped by a male officer and by defendant Boardman, who is female. Plaintiff
was stripped nude and defendant Boardman saw his genitals. This event robbed
petitioner of his elementary self-respect and personal dignity, and caused him embar-
rassment, humiliation, and mental distress. There was no need to have a female
participate in the strip search because there were ten male officers present.
Defendants knew that an inmate should not be strip searched in the presence of
officers of the opposite sex.
On several occasions, plaintiff has written an inmate complaint about this
incident. In the last complaint, #327-92, defendant Bell stated that "this is not a
violation of any code or law." However, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 306.16(7) states
that a visual body inspection shall be conducted by a person of the same sex to
preserve the dignity of the inmate.
Female officers observe male inmates in various states of undress and nudity
daily, while the inmates dress, sleep, shower, and use toilet facilities. This creates a
feeling of embarrassment and humiliation for the inmates.
Defendant Endicott knows these invasions of privacy occur and allows them to
continue happening on a daily basis even though defendant Endicott has the power
to make policies and enforce existing rules that would prohibit some of these
infringements on prisoners' privacy. Defendant Bell's job is to protect inmates'
rights, but he allows these deprivations to happen.
Id. at 255.
158. 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) ("The test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amend-
ment ... requires balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of
personal rights that the search entails.").
159. Canedy, 801 F. Supp. at 256.
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been subject to strip searches by female prison guards, and that
no effort has been made to accommodate his privacy interests
with the prison's legitimate interests in security and providing
equal employment opportunity. The district court nonetheless
dismissed the suit, apparently concluding that in light of the need
to allow female guards "to observe male prisoners and conduct
searches just as male officers would," no such accommodation is
necessary ....
But where it is reasonable-taking account of a state's
interests in prison security and in providing equal employment
opportunity for female guards-to respect an inmate's constitu-
tional privacy interests, doing so is not just a palliative to be
doled out at the state's indulgence. It is a constitutional man-
date.'6
The usual prisoner case involving a female guard, then, is an
allegation of a violation of a male inmate's privacy right based on a
female guard viewing or touching the inmate while he was at least
partially nude. Most courts which have addressed the issue were
persuaded that such a search implicated the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches. Other courts have analyzed
claims involving cross-gender searches under both the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments; at least one has restricted its analysis of such a claim to
the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments. Additionally, some courts have suggested that a correction
officer's-male or female-abuse of authority during a bodily search may
constitute a violation of the right to privacy under either the Fourth or
Eighth Amendment. 6'
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF PRISONER PRIVACY AND FEMALE
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS-ISSUES UNDECIDED
As the court in Johnson v. Phelan 62 recognized, women's employ-
160. Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 188 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).
161. See Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328,332 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The Court [in Bell
v. Wolfish] obviously recognized that not all strip search procedures will be reasonable; some
could be excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest.");
Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 365 n.9 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 835 (1987) ("[V]erbal
harassment [by guards while conducting otherwise valid bodily searches] is unacceptable. It
is demeaning and bears no relationship to the prison's legitimate security needs .... ");
Grummet v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1985) (taking into account fact that "the
female guards have conducted themselves in a professional manner"); Johnson v. Pennsylvania
Bureau of Corrections, 661 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (considering fact that "the
female guards have never abused the situation" of occasionally viewing nude male inmates).
162. 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Johnson v. Sheahan, 117 S. Ct. 506 (1996).
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ment rights under Title VII limit prisoners' claims to privacy in cases of
cross-gender searches.63 "Unless female guards are shuffled off to
back office jobs, itself problematic under Title VII, they are bound to see
the male prisoners in states of undress. Frequently. Deliberately.
Otherwise they are not doing their jobs."'n" The extent of Title VII's
limitation on prisoner privacy, however, is less than clear, in part because
of the existing judicial disagreement on the delineation of prisoners' right
to privacy.
A. Which Standard?
As evidenced by the cases discussed above, the Fourth Amendment
is the basis of choice for the majority of published opinions dealing with
male prisoner complaints against female correction officers.65 Most
courts have agreed that inmates possess a privacy right against being
viewed or touched, while nude or partially nude, by guards of the
opposite sex. Some have directed prisons to implement policies
protecting against the likelihood that a female guard will view a male
prisoner while he is nude. Nevertheless, at least one court has indicated
that the proper basis for analysis is the Eighth Amendment. Because of
the differing standards, which amendment-the Fourth or the
Eighth-underpins prisoners' rights against cross-gender searches is key
to both the result of the individual case and the broader implications of
prisoner privacy on employment issues.
Recently, in Johnson v. Phelan,'" the Seventh Circuit instructed
that prisoner "privacy" claims properly are categorized as invoking the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments.' 67
Albert Johnson complained that female guards at the Cook County Jail
monitored male prisoners' movements, and could see the prisoners naked
in their cells, the showers, and the toilets.168  The district court had
dismissed Johnson's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
163. Indeed, the court recognized that cross-sex prisoner monitoring "reduces the need
for prisons to make sex a criterion of employment, and therefore reduces the potential for
conflict with Title VII and the equal protection clause." Id. at 147.
164. Id. at 146.
165. Because the focus of this Article is on prisoner complaints involving female
correction officers, we will examine complaints brought by male inmates. Similar claims
involving male guards have been brought by female prisoners. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner,
986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
166. 69 F.3d at 144.
167. Id. at 147.
168. id. at 145.
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relief may be granted. 69 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated that in light of its decision in Canedy v. Boardman,7 ' Johnson's
argument merited discussion: "Our case involves visual rather than
tactile inspections, and we must decide whether male prisoners are
entitled to prevent female guards from watching them while un-
dressed."''
In holding that prisoner privacy claims are governed by the Eighth
rather than the Fourth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit noted simply
that in Hudson v. Palmer,'72 the Supreme Court held that prisoners do
not retain any right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment."
"[P]rivacy is the thing most surely extinguished by a judgment commit-
ting someone to prison. Guards take control of where and how prisoners
live; they do not retain any right of seclusion or secrecy against their
captors, who are entitled to watch and regulate every detail of daily
life."' 74 The court accordingly limited its holding in Canedy:
Anonymous visual inspections from afar are considerably less
intrusive and carry less potential for "the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain." To the extent incautious language in Canedy
implies that deliberate visual inspections are indistinguishable
from physical palpitations, its discussion is dictum. Further
reflection leads us to conclude that it should not be converted to
a holding. 75
Finding no evidence of punishment, the court concluded that the district
court was correct in dismissing Johnson's claim:
The fourth amendment does not protect privacy interests within
prisons. Moving to other amendments does not change the
outcome. Cross-sex monitoring is not a senseless imposition. As
a reconciliation of conflicting entitlements and desires, it satisfies
the Turner standard. It cannot be called "inhumane" and
therefore does not fall below the floor set by the objective
component of the eighth amendment.'
169. Id.
170. 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994).
171. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 145.
172. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
173. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 146.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 148.
176. Id. 150-51. Chief Judge Posner concurred and dissented with the majority's opinion
in Johnson. First noting the existing confusion caused by references to prisoners' "right to
privacy" and analysis under the Fourth Amendment, Judge Posner agreed that the Eighth
Amendment governed Johnson's claim. Judge Posner made clear, however, that in his view,
the Eighth Amendment "requires ... that reasonable efforts be made to prevent frequent,
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Despite the Seventh Circuit's sensible (in light of Supreme Court case
law) conclusion that prisoners do not retain any privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment (with the possible exception of body-cavity
searches), several courts continue to examine prisoner privacy claims
under the Fourth Amendment, as discussed above."7 As the differing
holdings in Canedy and Johnson hint, whether a prisoner's privacy claim
is analyzed under the Fourth or the Eighth Amendment very well may
affect the court's outcome. The Eighth Amendment's subjective
requirement of deliberate indifference will preclude claims otherwise
viable under the Fourth Amendment's objective "reasonableness"
standard. Judicial disagreement over the correct constitutional standard
thus confuses the boundaries of prisoner privacy.
The recent amendments to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act178 increase the importance of the applied standard. Under
the newly enacted amendments, prisoners must exhaust their administra-
tive remedies before bringing section 1983 claims regarding "prison
conditions."7 Further, prisoners may not bring such an action "for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury."80 Because "prison conditions" appear to
be defined broadly, it is likely that these new limitations will apply to
"privacy" (actually conditions of confinement) claims analyzed under the
Eighth Amendment. The limitations will have the effect of decreasing
the number of prisoner claims under section 1983, and thus lessening the
potential liability of prisons for instituting cross-gender searches.
However, if the court chooses to analyze a prisoner's privacy claim
involving a cross-gender search under the Fourth Amendment, the Act's
physical-injury limitation might be sidestepped.
B. Tactile v. Visual Searches
The Johnson court recognized a difference between tactile and visual
intrusions on prisoner privacy, and even went so far as to suggest that
cross-gender visual searches do not violate the Eighth Amendment:
How odd it would be to find in the eighth amendment a right
deliberate, gratuitous exposure of nude prisoners of one sex to guards of the other sex." Id.
at 155 (Posner, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
177. See also, e.g., Tracy McMath, Comment, Do Prison Inmates Retain Any Fourth
Amendment Protection From Body Cavity Searches?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1987).
178. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1997).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1997).
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not to be seen by the other sex. Physicians and nurses of one sex
routinely examine the other. In exotic places such as California
people regularly sit in saunas and hot tubs with unclothed
strangers. Most persons' aversion to public nudity pales com-
pared with the taboo against detailed inspections of body cavities,
yet the Court found no constitutional obstacle to these in Wolfish;
the Constitution does not require prison managers to respect the
social conventions of free society. Drug testing is common,
although this often requires observation of urination. More to
the point, the clash between modesty and equal employment
opportunities has been played out in sports. Women reporters
routinely enter locker rooms after games. How could an
imposition that male athletes tolerate be deemed cruel and
unusual punishment?'
Although other courts have found that the Constitution forbids
deliberate cross-gender monitoring in prisons, most courts have analyzed
these claims under the Fourth Amendment."8 Under Hudson v.
Palmer,83 however, this analysis is likely incorrect. Any Fourth
Amendment rights retained by prisoners should apply only to tactile
bodily searches. How (and whether) this last bastion of the Fourth
Amendment in prisons will play out depends on courts' willingness to
restrict or expand the hole Hudson left.
As a rule, visual searches will not cause physical injury, thus
precluding recovery for mental or emotional injury under the amend-
ments to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act."8 Thus,
cross-gender visual searches may become a moot consideration in terms
of potential liability for prisons.
C Gender Neutral or Gender Specific?
In cross-gender, clothed-body searches of inmates, the issue remains
ambiguous as to whether a gender-specific or gender-neutral standard
will be applied to alleged constitutional violations. Prior case law
suggests that prisoners' legitimate rights to privacy-to be free from
unnecessary searches of their private body areas by guards of the
opposite sex or to have their naked bodies exposed unnecessarily to
guards of the opposite sex-is extremely limited, and although the issue
of gender is a consideration, it is not a deciding factor. The constitu-
181. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 148 (citations omitted).
182. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916-17 (6th Cir. 1992).
183. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
184. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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tional questions have concerned the invasiveness of the cross-gender
search, the manner in which it was conducted, and the necessity of the
search.
For example, in Smith v. Fairman,8 5 the court held that allowing
female prison guards to conduct pat down searches of male inmates,
excluding the genital area, was constitutional.186 A male inmate
objected to a clothed-body search by a member of the opposite sex.
He alleged "that in conducting such a search, a female guard would place
her hands on his neck, back, chest, stomach, waist, buttocks, and the
outside of his thighs and legs."'" He asserted that "having female
guards conduct such searches was totally unnecessary and was intended
to degrade and humiliate male inmates."'89  Furthermore, the inmate
claimed that "requiring him to submit to such a search constituted cruel
and unusual punishment... 2,190
The court did not agree that a pat down search of a male inmate by
a female guard, excluding the genital area, was offensive to the
Constitution, concluding that "requiring the plaintiff to submit to a
limited frisk-type search by a female guard infringes upon no right
guaranteed by the Constitution."''9
In Grummett v. Rushen,'g the court ruled that pat down searches,
including the groin area, of male prisoners by women guards do not
violate the Fourth Amendment simply because a correctional officer of
the opposite gender conducts such a search. 93 The searches were non-
invasive since they did not involve intimate contact with an inmate's
body.94 In Michenfelder v. Sumner,'95 the court found that occasion-
185. 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982).
186. Id. at 53. The court recognized that the female guards did not conduct full searches
but merely patted down the clothing over the inmate's neck, back, stomach, arms, and legs.
They were given explicit instructions not to search the genital area. In addition, all
correctional officers were instructed to conduct these searches in a polite, dignified manner
and to avoid degrading or humiliating the inmate.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 53.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 55.
192. 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
193. Id. at 491, 496. The Court found the pat down searches conducted by the female
guards were not so offensive as to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The
searches were done briefly and while the inmates were fully clothed and thus did not involve
contact with the inmates' bodies. Id. The record indicated that the searches were performed
by the female guards in a professional manner and with respect for the inmates. Id.
194. Id. at 495.
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al visual strip searches by female guards do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.'96 Plaintiff alleged that he experienced some embarrass-
ment "through a strip search by female officers."'" The conclusion was
that embarrassment alone because of casual observations by others does
not offend the Constitution.98 The courts have recognized the momen-
tary degradation and humiliation of frisk and pat down searches as a
violation of inmate privacy. In previous rulings, a gender-neutral
standard has been applied in which there is no discussion of the differing
histories, perspectives, and experiences of male and female inmates and
their relationship to the allegations of humiliation, degradation, and pain
during and after cross-gender searches.
However, in at least one instance, a court has adopted a different
standard in its evaluation of whether a prison security policy evinced the
"unnecessary and wanton" infliction of pain for cruel and unusual
punishment in cases concerning cross-gender searches.' 99 This standard
has been termed "gender specific" because of its focus on the differing
perceptions and experiences of women with regard to sexuality and
abuse."° Accordingly, these unique perceptions and experiences may
trigger the cruel and unusual punishment clause protections under
different prison conditions.
In Jordan v. Gardner,"' inmates at the Washington Corrections
Center for Women (WCCW) challenged a policy which mandated that
both male and female guards conduct random clothed-body searches of
inmates. The district court held that the cross-gender searches at
WCCW violated the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment rights of the
women inmates. Although a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court on appeal, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc upheld the
district court's conclusion that the cross gender policy at WCCW
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 2 The court's findings of fact concerned the effects of
cross-gender clothed-body searches on the women inmates.
195. 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988).
196. Id. at 334.
197. Id. at 333.
198. Id. at 333-34.
199. See Lisa Krim, A Reasonable Woman's Version of Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
Cross-Gender, Clothed-Body Searches of Women Prisoners, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 85, 99
(1995).
200. Id. at 105.
201. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1521, 1522 (9th Cir. 1993).
202. Jordon v. Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and superseded, 986 F.2d.
1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
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At issue was the constitutionality of a search policy which permitted
random cross-gender pat down searches of women inmates in order to
control the flow of contraband within the prison. 3 During the so-
called "pat" search,
a guard is to "[u]se a flat hand and pushing motion across the
[inmate's] crotch area." The guard must "[p]ush inward and
upward when searching the crotch and upper thighs of the
inmate. All seams in the leg and the crotch area are to be
squeezed and knead[ed]." Using the back of the hand, the guard
also is to search the breast area in a sweeping motion, so that the
breasts will be "flattened." 204
The court observed that the intrusive, probing nature of the searches
permit "men in positions of ultimate authority to flatten the breasts of
women who are powerless and totally subject to their control ... , 205
The policy was referred to as "offensive in the extreme to all women,
regardless of their prior sexual history" and thus even inmates who did
not have a history of sexual abuse would suffer similar substantial
psychological harm.2' A gender-specific standard was apparent in the
court's consideration of the psychological impact of the cross-gender
search on the women. The testimony of the women inmates and ten
experts characterized the psychological impact of forced submission by
male guards. 2°7 Furthermore, the court considered the history of sexual
abuse reported to WCCW counselors:
The record in the case, including the depositions of several in-
mates .... describes the shocking background of verbal, physical,
and, in particular, sexual abuse endured by many of the inmates
at WCCW. For example, one inmate, who gave live trial
testimony, described rapes by strangers (twice) and by husbands
or boyfriends. She was also beaten by various men in her life;
two deprived her of adequate food; one pushed her out of a
moving car. Her story is not particularly unique. Eighty-five
percent of the inmates report a history of such abuse to WCCW
counselors, including rapes, molestations, beatings, and slav-
ery.2
0 8
Several inmates were subjected to the searches on the day the policy
203. Jordon, 953 F.2d at 1138-39.
204. Id. at 1145 (citations omitted).
205. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1540.
206. Id. (emphasis in original).
.207. Id. at 1525-26.
208. Jordon, 953 F.2d at 1146.
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was implemented. One, who had a long history of sexual abuse by men,
unwillingly submitted to the cross-gender, clothed-body search and
suffered severe distress: she had to have her fingers pried loose from the
bars she had grabbed during the search, and she vomited later after
returning to her cell block.'tl The court was satisfied that the constitu-
tional standard for a finding of "pain" was met.21° The court distin-
guished prior case law on the basis of the longer lasting psychological
pain experienced by the women inmates at WCCW. Referring to
Grummett v. Rushen, the court asserted that the male inmates had not
shown sufficient pain or likelihood of psychological trauma as a result of
searches to make out a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.21 The
frequency and scope of the searches in Grummett and Michenfelder were
significantly less invasive than the search at issue here.
Deliberate indifference to the possibility of psychological pain was
also demonstrated by the actions of the warden. Despite warnings from
psychologists on his staff that the cross-gender searches could cause
severe psychological stress in some female inmates, the warden still
implemented the policy.212 The court decided that the infliction of
psychological pain on female inmates was "wanton" for Eighth Amend-
ment purposes when prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to
the harm such searches were likely to cause by implementing the search
policy despite warnings regarding its effect on inmates.2 '3  Further-
more, the cross-gender policy was developed over time, with ample
opportunity for reflection.1 4
Hence, in Jordan v. Gardner, the court implicitly applied a gender-
specific analysis in its evaluation of the pain inflicted by the cross-gender,
clothed-body search from the perspective of women inmates. One
commentator contends that this gender-specific standard should be
adopted in determining whether cross-gender, clothed-body searches
constitute an objectively cruel and unusual condition of confinement:
If one accepts the basic assumption that the cognitive perceptions
of men and women sometimes differ and recognizes the fact that
the experience of incarceration is different for men and women,
the importance of building gender into the standard for the
objective part of the test for cruel and unusual punishment in
209. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1523.
210. Id. at 1526.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1523.
213. Id. at 1527-28.
214. Id. at 1528.
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conditions of confinement becomes clear. Without recognizing
these differences, the test is not truly "objective." In fact, an
inquiry that fails to account for the differences between the sexes
turns out, in our society, to be based on male experiences and to
thus lose its objectivity. Without building into the standard the
perceptions of both men and women, the standard is tailored for
when a man perceives that conditions of confinement such as
cross-gender searches have become cruel, without regard to when
a woman perceives that the treatment has crossed the line.1 5
The standard should focus on gender so that no one in the prison system,
regardless of gender, is treated in a way that is cruel and unusual. 16
Whether Jordan v. Gardner is a portend for future cases concerning
cross-gender searches of inmates remains an unresolved issue.
D. Impact on Employment Rights of Corrections Officers
Women clearly have obtained the right to work in men's prisons.
Prior to 1972, virtually no women worked as correctional officers in male
prisons; today, women supervise male inmates in every state and federal
prison, as well as in most county institutions. 217 Title VII provided
entry to employment in men's prisons. Courts have held that gender is
not a bona fide occupational qualification which precludes women from
working in all-male facilities. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,18 the Supreme
Court struck down institutional barriers in the form of height and weight
requirements which excluded over forty-one percent of the female
population and less than one percent of the male population from
employment as a correctional officer.2 19 The showing of disparate
impact of the height and weight standards on women based on national
statistics sufficed to make out a prima facie case of employment
discrimination."0
Although the courts have established the right of women to work in
correctional employment, women have no guarantee of equal assignment
and opportunity once hired. There is still considerable legal ambiguity
with regard to equality in job assignments. Courts have been inconsis-
tent and ambiguous in their rulings regarding the assignments of women
215. See Krim, supra note 200, at 105.
216. See id. at 89.
217. Lynn Zimmer, Solving Women's Employment Problems in Corrections: Shifting the
Burden to Administrators, 1 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 55 (1989).
218. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
219. Id. at 329-30.
220. Id. at 331.
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guards in relation to inmate privacy. The assignment to certain posts in
men's prisons which do not involve direct inmate contact positions
largely have been justified by administrators as necessary to protect
inmate privacy. The courts have directed the prison administration to
strike a balance between the equal employment rights of women
correctional officers and the privacy rights of inmates. The resulting
conflict between these competing interests generally has been resolved
by attempting to accommodate both interests through adjustments in
scheduling and job responsibilities for the women guards. For example,
in Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory,"2 the court questioned
the validity of claims made by prison administrators that they could not
adjust assignments so that women could qualify for CO II positions in
non-privacy areas because it would be economically and administratively
unsound and unfair to male co-workers.222 Job assignment adjustments
within the facility in the past had not undermined the prison's goals or
essential functions.3 The court asserted that adjustments could be
made without jeopardizing privacy rights of prisoners or disrupting
efficient management or core goals. 224
Similarly, in Harden v. Dayton Rehabilitation Center,' the court
was unable to find that job reassignment would undermine the "essence
of the job." The defendants were urged to make accommodations that
would reconcile the competing interests of inmate privacy and equal
employment opportunities for the women guards. Courts have suggested
reorganization of prison assignments so that some assignments would be
free of privacy-invading duties and the provision of privacy screens or
barriers for inmates while engaged in intimate activities. 26
In other rulings, the courts appear to favor the equal employment
rights of women correctional officers over prisoner privacy. In Grummett
v. Rushen,227 the court ruled in favor of the women's employment
rights and against the privacy claims of inmates. The court asserted that
to "restrict the female guards from positions which involve occasional
viewing of the inmates would necessitate a tremendous rearrangement
of work schedules, and possibly produce a risk to both internal security
221. 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 446
U.S. 966 (1980).
222. Id. at 957.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981), affd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985).
226. Zimmer, supra note 218, at 59.
227. 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
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needs and equal employment opportunities for the female guards.""8
In another case, Smith v. Fairman,2 9 the court recognized that the state
had a strong interest in avoiding sex discrimination in its hiring practices
at the prison. In light of this interest and given the limited scope of the
search, the court concluded that allowing female officers to perform the
search did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights."0
Professor Zimmer suggests that the Grummett decision might be seen
as the beginning of the erosion of prisoner rights and an expansion of
women's rights to equal assignments in the prison."' The meaning of
this subtle judicial shift toward the recognition of the interests of women
guards to be treated fairly in the workplace, which includes equality in
job assignments, is unclear. Whether case law signals a legal climate in
which women's rights to equal work opportunities will be safeguarded is
also unclear. The different court rulings create confusion for prison
administrators in the interpretation and implementation of job assign-
ment policies within their prisons. Without a definitive and protective
stance from the courts, female correctional officers will continue to
experience discrimination and opposition in their work assignments, and
prison administrators will remain reluctant to deploy and treat women
on an equal basis with men.
V. CONCLUSION
Court decisions regarding prisoner privacy and cross-gender searches
are all over the board, making it difficult for prison management to
accurately take into account any potential liability and act accordingly.
The failure of courts to analyze prisoner privacy claims uniformly has
effectively limited employment opportunities for female correctional
officers.
When Supreme Court precedent and federal law are read sensibly,
however, the correct standards emerge. The vast majority of claims of
prisoner "privacy" involving cross-gender searches, both visual and
tactile, likely should be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment's
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The settled require-
ments for Eighth Amendment claims, as well as the newly amended Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, will preclude prison liability in
most cases, but will continue to protect prisoners from abusive practices.
228. Id. at 496.
229. 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982).
230. Id. at 53.
231. Zimmer, supra note 218, at 61.
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If a court decides to apply the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard in a particular case, it should be careful to square its analysis
with existing law. Further, courts should take into account the differing
experiences and perceptions of male and female prisoners when
evaluating the harm of cross-gender searches. Most importantly,
however, courts must be conscious of the effect of their rulings on
women's employment rights.
It is up to the courts to take a more careful and reasoned approach
to prisoner privacy claims. Appellate courts should follow the lead of
the Seventh Circuit and state in no uncertain terms the applicable law.
Only when some degree of uniformity is achieved will prisons be able to
conform to the applicable standards. Uncertainty over potential liability
encumbers prison management and compromises women's employment
rights.
